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Introduction 
 
This dissertation explores National Treasury’s mark-to-market proposal which aims 
to tax the unrealised capital gains of long-term insurance policyholders on an annual 
basis. Although the proposal was ultimately rejected it remains under consideration. 
 
The mark-to-market proposal is evaluated against its intended purpose. The intended 
purpose is understood to be the collection by the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) of capital gains tax (CGT) which has been ‘effectively withheld’ from 
policyholders by the insurer. Having gained an understanding of the mark-to-market 
proposal and its intended purpose, the proposal will be measured against the 
following criteria: 
 
 Does it succeed in recovering capital gains taxes which have been ‘effectively 
withheld’ from policyholders?  
 What are the side-effects of the proposal, if any? 
 
The practical implementation of the proposal falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
 
Chapter I provides a basic overview of capital gains tax and the taxation of the long-
term insurance industry.  
 
Chapter II describes the events which led to the proposal and ultimate withdrawal of 
mark-to-market taxation. 
 
Chapter III explores the finer mechanics of CGT in the long-term insurance 
environment and considers the intended purpose of the mark-to-market proposal with 
this as background. 
 
Chapter IV evaluates the theoretical outcome of the proposal against its intended 
purpose.  As a start, a hypothetical case study determines the financial impact of the 
proposal under actual market conditions over the past ten years (2003 to 2012). This 
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
is followed by an assessment of the appropriateness of the proposal in achieving its 
intended purpose, whereby certain side-effects of the proposal are pointed out. 
 
Chapter V includes an analysis of the tax neutrality between a long-term insurance 
investment policy and a competitive alternative investment, in this case one in a 
portfolio of a collective investment scheme in securities (CIS). 
 
Chapter VI sets out the findings arising from the research performed and concludes 
with recommendations. 
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Chapter I – Overview of capital gains tax and the four funds approach 
 
In order to explore the impact of changes to the taxation of capital gains in the long-
term insurance environment, it is essential to have a basic understanding of two of 
the more complex areas in South African tax law, namely capital gains tax and the 
four funds approach. This chapter provides a basic overview and is limited to that 
which is relevant to enable an understanding of the remainder of this dissertation. 
 
1.1 Overview of capital gains tax 
 
Gross income is defined as ‘the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or 
accrued to or in favour of such [person] ... during such year or period of assessment, 
excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature...’.1 By definition, gross income 
specifically excludes ‘receipts or accruals of a capital nature’. Accordingly capital 
income is not accounted for in taxable income by way of an inclusion in gross 
income. Instead the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’) 
provides for the calculation of a person’s taxable capital gain and it is this taxable 
capital gain which is included in the taxable income of that person.2 
 
In its basic form, a capital gain arises where a capital asset is sold, or otherwise 
disposed of.3 Any profit or loss from the disposal of a capital asset is referred to as a 
capital gain or capital loss and is subject to capital gains tax. With the CGT liability 
being triggered by a disposal or deemed disposal of an asset, this addresses any 
liquidity issues which could arise if taxes were charged on unrealised assets. SARS 
refers to this dependency on a disposal of an asset as a ‘realisation basis’ of 
taxation.4 
 
The Eighth Schedule to the Act contains an intricate set of rules for the calculation of 
capital gains and losses which will not be covered here. What is important to note is 
that after the calculation of all the capital gains and losses from each asset disposal 
 
1
 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
2
 Section 26A of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
3
 Paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
4
 SARS Guide to Capital Gains Tax (2000) 24. 
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during a year of assessment, these are aggregated.5 Where the net result is a profit, 
only a portion of this net capital gain is required to be included in taxable income.6 
The percentage to be included is commonly referred to as the ‘CGT inclusion rate’. 
A net capital loss is not subtracted from taxable income but can be carried forward 
for set-off against future capital gains.7 
 
Since only a portion of the net capital gain is included in taxable income, the 
effective tax rate applicable to capital gains is lower than the rate applicable to a 
person’s normal income. As a result the concept of what constitutes a capital asset is 
one of the most debated tax issues in South Africa. In respect of the sale of an asset, 
courts have held that the intention with which an asset is acquired and ultimately 
realised is an important factor in determining whether the asset was of a capital 
nature and, in the absence of other factors indicating the contrary, is conclusive. 
Where this intention involved a scheme of profit-making from the sale of an asset, 
the receipt from the disposal of such asset is not on capital account and falls within 
the ambit of gross income.8  
 
This dissertation does not intend to partake in this debate and assumes that all assets 
held and administered by long-term insurance companies (also ‘insurers’ or ‘life 
companies’) for the benefit of policyholders are of a capital nature. As such any 
referral to ‘asset’ will bear the meaning of an asset held on capital account. 
 
1.2 Overview of the four funds approach 
 
Long-term insurance companies are taxed in accordance with a unique model, the 
rules of which are contained in s 29A of the Act. In practice referred to as the ‘four 
funds approach’, this model caters for the separate taxation, on an accrual basis, of 
the insurer’s profits from the underwriting of insurance products on the one hand, 
and policyholder investment income on the other.9 
 
5
 Paragraph 6 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
6
 Paragraph 10 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
7
 Paragraphs 8 to 10 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
8
 CIR v Stott 1928 AD 252, 3 SATC 253; Natal Estates Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 77 (A), 37 SATC 193. 
9
 PA Donaldson An analysis of the appropriateness of the four funds approach for the taxation of life 
insurers in South Africa including a qualitative comparison to the recently enacted approach adopted 
in New Zealand and recommendations for improvement to the approach MCom (UCT) (2011) iv. 
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The four funds approach was enacted in 1993 following its proposal by the Jacobs 
Committee. One of the key principles motivated by the Jacobs Committee was that 
‘[t]he “trustee principle” should be adhered to in respect of all income representative 
of the insurer’s constituent body of policyholders and should reflect all relevant 
aspects of their taxation, including the effective tax rate.’10  
 
The trustee principle is pivotal to the four funds approach. It is a practical solution to 
the taxation of policyholder income. The life insurer acts as trustee on behalf of 
policyholders with regards to the calculation and collection of income taxes on 
policyholder investments.11 As such the tax liability is administered on behalf of the 
policyholders in the hands of the life insurer.  
 
Very importantly, this achieves the taxation of policyholder income on an accrual 
basis. This is essential because due to the long-term nature of long-term insurance 
products, ‘[t]axing the full savings element at the time of the benefit payment would 
be a deferral of tax which is unlikely to be acceptable to the revenue collectors.’12 
The taxing of policyholder income during the roll-up stage of the investment means 
that benefits paid to policyholders are almost always already after tax.13 
 
The fact that the tax affairs are taken care of in the hands of the insurer further 
sidesteps the issue of policyholder liquidity. Clover explains, ‘[i]f the tax liability for 
income is passed on to the policyholder as the income accrues, there is the problem 
that tax becomes payable before the individual has access to the income that 
generated the tax liability’.14 Taxing policyholder income in the hands of the insurer 
greatly reduces the administrative burden on policyholders, which is an important 
selling point of life policies.  
 
On the contrary, one of the greatest weaknesses of the four funds approach also 
stems from the application of the trustee principle. Taxing policyholders centrally at 
the insurer level does not allow knowledge of each individual policyholder’s 
 
10
 Jacobs Committee ‘Report of the committee of investigation into the promotion of equal 
 competition for funds in financial markets in South Africa’ (1992) 89. 
11
 National Treasury ‘Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill’ (2012) 60. 
12
 RJ Clover ‘Taxation of Life Insurance in South Africa Revisited’ (2008) 8 SAAJ 1 at 3. 
13
 Donaldson op cit (n9) 9; Clover op cit (n12) 4. 
14
 Clover op cit (n12) 4. 
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effective tax rate for any year of assessment. Instead a single flat tax rate applies in 
respect of the taxation of individual policyholders’ income. A 30 per cent tax rate 
was proposed as an appropriate average individual policyholder tax rate when the 
four funds approach was originally designed.15 This proxy tax rate is a notorious 
weakness of the four funds approach, but an accepted pragmatic approach.16 
 
To give effect to the trustee principle, s29A(4) of the Act requires the insurer to 
establish four separate funds, each effectively representing a separate taxpayer. One 
of these, the Corporate Fund (‘CF’), represents the interest of the corporate entity 
conducting the insurance business. In practice the CF is commonly referred to as the 
shareholder.  
 
The other three tax funds represent the interests of the policyholders. These are:  
 the Individual Policyholder Fund (‘IPF’),  
 the Company Policyholder Fund (‘CPF’), and  
 the Untaxed Policyholder Fund (‘UPF’).  
 
The reason for the three categories of policyholder funds is that each represents 
policyholders of a different nature who are normally taxed at different tax rates. The 
UPF includes mainly tax exempt policyholders (eg pension funds) and is itself 
exempt from tax. The CPF includes companies and is taxed at the company tax rate 
of 28 per cent. The IPF includes all other policyholders17 (mainly individuals) and is 
taxed at 30 per cent.18 
 
This dissertation will focus solely on individual policyholders as represented by the 
IPF. The UPF is not impacted by the mark-to-market proposal as it is a tax exempt 
body. Out of the remaining two policyholder funds the IPF accounts for the vast 
majority of insurance products. Any reference to ‘policyholder’ will accordingly be 
to an individual, unless otherwise stated.  
 
15
 Jacobs op cit (n10) 92. 
16
 Donaldson op cit (n9) 48-9. 
17
 Section 29(4)(a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
18
 Section 3(d) of the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Act No 13 of 
 2012. 
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Chapter II – Proposal of the annual mark-to-market taxation of long-term 
insurance policyholders 
 
2.1 The 2012 budget speech – increase of the annual inclusion rate 
 
On 22 February 2012, Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, in delivering the 2012 
National Budget Speech, announced an increase in the capital gains inclusion rates. 
The increased rates were enacted on 13 March 2012 and are already effective, 
applying to years of assessment commencing on or after 1 March 2012.19 
 
As noted in Chapter I, only a portion of a person’s net capital gain is included in 
taxable income. Before 1 March 2012 individuals included only 25 per cent of their 
net capital gain in taxable income. This inclusion rate increased to 33.3 per cent 
effective 1 March 2012. The increase in the capital gains inclusion rate therefore 
increased the effective CGT rate of the IPF from 7.5 per cent to 10 per cent.20 An 
amendment to paragraph 10 of the Eighth Schedule provides specifically for the new 
inclusion rates to apply in respect of an insurer’s policyholder funds for asset 
disposals on or after 1 March 2012.21 
 
2.2 Adverse impact on insurers’ tax position 
 
The increase in the effective CGT rate posed an immediate problem to the tax 
position of insurers. Acting as trustees on behalf of millions of policyholders, life 
companies manage large asset portfolios for the benefit of their policyholders. In 
terms of the four funds approach the insurer withholds and pays over various taxes as 
proxy for those policyholders. This includes CGT on policyholder assets. 
 
The problem facing life insurers following the increased CGT rates is one of timing 
and sprouts from the fact that there is often a lag between the insurer withholding 
CGT in its role as trustee and the payment thereof to SARS. Chapter III will explore 
the finer mechanics of CGT in the life environment and specifically consider the idea 
 
19
 Section 9(1) of the Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendment of Revenue Laws Act No 13 of 
 2012. 
20
 30% x 25% = 7.5%; 30% x 33.3% = 10%. 
21
 Section 105 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No 22 of 2012. 
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of ‘effectively withholding’ CGT as a trustee. For now it is enough to know that, at 
the time of withholding CGT from policyholders, the insurer had a certain 
expectation of the future CGT on unrealised capital gains, and that the CGT 
ultimately due on those gains will now have increased. 
 
In practice, life insurers are the legal owners of the policyholder investment assets. 
Under the trustee principle policyholders have a notional ownership in the assets.22 
During a year of assessment certain policies may mature and disinvest from their 
notional interest in the portfolio, while new policies may enter the portfolio to 
acquire a notional interest. As a result of this continuous in and out flow of 
policyholder funds, there is often no need for the insurer to dispose of the underlying 
assets in order to fund benefit payments.23 This results in an indefinite tax deferral 
which would not have existed if the notional ownership (where a notional 
disinvestment from the assets does not trigger CGT) was in fact a legal ownership 
(where disinvestment from the assets would trigger CGT). 
 
Upon the notional disinvestment by a policyholder the insurer calculates and 
withholds an amount representing CGT on the notional disposal. The disconnection 
between notional and legal disposal creates a timing lag between the withholding of 
CGT and the payment thereof to SARS. The increase in the CGT inclusion rates 
means that, when the actual assets are disposed of, more tax is payable than what 
was previously withheld. 
 
The following example was published by National Treasury to illustrate the 
problem:24 
 
Facts:  
Long-term Insurer purchases Share X for the benefit of Individual 
Policyholder A on 15 June 2011 at the price of R100. On 20 February 
2012, notional ownership of Share X switches from Individual 
policyholder A whose policy matures to individual Policyholder B when 
the value of share X is R200. Long-term insurer sells Share X for the 
benefit of Individual Policyholder B on 10 August 2012 when the value 
of Share X is R250. 
 
22
 The concept of ‘notional ownership’ is covered in more detail in Chapter III. 
23
 Benefit payments are also referred to as a “claims” or “policy pay-outs”. 
24
 National Treasury Media Statement ‘Effective date of increased capital gains tax rates for long-term 
 insurers and related matters’ (2011) 2. 
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Result:  
Long-term insurer allocates R92.50 of post-tax gain to Individual 
Policyholder A on 20 February 2012. This gain is based on the R100 
unrealised gain in respect of Share X less reserving of R7.50 for the 
Capital Gains Tax (i.e. effective rate of 7.5 per cent on the notional 
gain of R100). Long-term insurer allocates R45 of post-tax gain to 
Policyholder B on 10 August 2012 (R50 realised gain less the capital 
gains tax of R5), less a further capital gains tax charge of R2.50 (2.5 
per cent on the initial R100 gain which is realised on 10 August 2012). 
 
In essence, because the effective capital gains tax rate is increasing 
from 7.5 per cent to 10 per cent by the date of disposal, an additional 
2.5 per cent charge is due in respect of the R100 prior notional capital 
gain allocated to individual Policyholder A as shown in the Example. 
However, this amount cannot be properly charged against individual 
Policyholder A as the actual disposal of Share X occurred after that 
individual ceased to be a policyholder. Therefore, the additional 2.5 per 
cent charge will ultimately have to be borne by Individual Policyholder 
B because Individual Policyholder B is the only remaining policyholder 
that is notionally connected to Share X at the time of disposal. 
 
2.3 Remedy: A once-off deemed disposal event 
 
On 16 April 2012 National Treasury published a Media Statement in response to life 
industry concerns which aimed to deal with this anomaly. It was proposed that all 
unrealised gains on policyholder assets as at the close of 29 February 2012 be 
realised by way of a deemed disposal and immediate reacquisition of the underlying 
assets (the ‘once-off deemed disposal event’).25 The deemed disposal has the effect 
of taxing all gains accruing before 1 March 2012 at the old lower effective CGT rate 
of 7.5 per cent. The deemed reacquisition adjusts the base cost of policyholder assets 
to the asset values as at the close of 29 February 2012. As such unrealised capital 
gains are reset to zero and any subsequent disposal of an asset will trigger tax only 
on the gain or loss accumulating from 1 March 2012 onwards, with this amount 
taxable at the new CGT rate of 10 per cent. 
 
The disadvantage of the once-off deemed disposal event is that it triggers the 
payment of tax on the unrealised gains of the entire26 policyholder asset portfolio, 
without the actual realisation of the underlying assets. This drawback was accepted 
 
25
 National Treasury op cit (n24) 3. 
26
 Subsequently the once-off deemed disposal rules were amended to scope out certain instruments. 
 These relate largely to interest bearing instruments  which are not expected to produce significant 
 capital gains. 
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by the industry as a compromise for the special dispensation to make use of the 
lower tax rate.27 In order to fund the tax payment an outflow of policyholder assets is 
required. To remedy the negative impact of this unexpected cash outflow on 
liquidity, the tax on the deemed disposal event is spread over a period of four 
years.28 
 
In addition to the above, National Treasury briefly raised the question of whether 
unrealised capital gains on policyholder assets should simply be taxed on an annual 
mark-to-market basis (the ‘mark-to-market proposal’ or ‘the proposal’).29 This would 
mean effectively having a deemed disposal, similar to the one on 29 February 2012, 
at the end of each year of assessment of an insurer. In July 2012 the draft Taxation 
Laws Amendment Bill 2012 was published and included a new section, Section 29B, 
titled ‘Mark-to-market taxation in respect of long-term insurers’. As expected, this 
section included the details in respect of the once-off deemed disposal event. 
Surprisingly it also provided for the mark-to-market proposal.30 
 
2.4 Life industry objections 
 
Various meetings between National Treasury, long-term insurance industry 
stakeholders and SARS followed. Although in agreement with the once-off deemed 
disposal event, the industry objected to the mark-to-market proposal. The opposition 
was mainly for two reasons: 
 
1) An annual tax on the growth in policyholder assets would erode policyholder 
investment returns because of the law of compound returns; and 
2) A tax on unrealised capital gains would put strain on liquidity exactly 
because the assets being taxed remain unrealised.31 
 
Although the draft s29B did provide for the CGT liability arising on each deemed 
disposal to be spread over a period of four years,32 this provides only temporary 
 
27
 ASISA Letter to: Chief Director of Legal Tax Design, National Treasury (28 February 2012). 
28
 National Treasury op cit (n24) 4. 
29
 National Treasury op cit (n24) 4-5. 
30
 Section 70(1) of the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012. 
31
 ASISA op cit (n27). 
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relief. After four years each payment would again represent four quarters and will 
only have the effect of smoothing payments. There would thus no longer be any tax 
deferral in relation to unrealised capital growth. 
 
National Treasury agreed to put the mark-to-market proposal on hold and to review 
this as part of an ongoing project whereby the entire four funds tax model is being 
reviewed. 33  The final version of the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2012 was 
published on 25 October 2012 (promulgated on 1 February 2013) with s29B 
remaining in place under the heading ‘Mark-to-market taxation in respect of long-
term insurers’. It provides only for the once-off deemed disposal on 29 February 
2012 but not for the mark-to-market proposal. It is certainly clear that National 
Treasury has not completely withdrawn the proposal, but is merely reconsidering 
pending further investigation. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to assist with this investigation.  
    
32
 Section 70(1) of the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012. 
33
 Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF) ‘Report-Back Hearings: Draft Taxation Laws 
 Amendments Bill, 2012 and Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill, 2012’ (2012) 18. 
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Chapter III – Understanding the mark-to-market proposal 
 
3.1 Understanding the mechanics of CGT in the life insurance environment 
 
3.1.1 Build-up of policyholder assets 
 
In terms of the four funds approach, the insurer is required to place 34  in each 
policyholder fund assets with a market value equal to the value of policyholder 
liabilities.35 In general terms, the policyholder liabilities represent the present value 
of expected future benefit payments to policyholders, actuarially determined in terms 
of the prescribed statutory valuation method.36 The assets referred to are funded from 
policyholder contributions in the form of premiums. These assets produce 
investment returns, mainly in the form of dividends, interest, rental and capital 
growth. In terms of the trustee principle, the investment returns are taxable in the 
hands of the insurer and hence only the after-tax investment return can be applied for 
the benefit of policyholders. While dividends, interest and rental is taxed as it is 
earned, capital growth remains unrealised and untaxed until the asset is disposed. 
This is in accordance with the realisation basis of the Eighth Schedule of the Act as 
discussed in Chapter I.  
 
The policyholder asset base thus comprises of net policyholder contributions (ie 
premiums less claims and expenses), 37 taxed investment income (including realised 
capital gains), and untaxed unrealised capital gains. 
 
For investment income (ie interest, dividends, rental) it is a theoretically simple 
exercise to deduct tax from the gross return, allocate the net return to policyholders 
and pay the tax component over to SARS.38 In similar fashion, where policyholder 
assets have been disposed of during a year of assessment the insurer allocates any 
 
34
 ‘Place’ under the conceptual four funds model means ‘allocate’ or ‘attribute’. 
35
 Section 29A(4) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
36
 Schedule 3 to the Long Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998. 
37
 Expenses and the insurer’s profits are also taken from the policyholder asset base, but for the  
  remainder of this discussion it can be accepted that these have already been stripped from the  
  policy premium. 
38
 Policyholder investment income is to a large extent subject to the standard income tax rules while 
 s 29A(11) prescribes special rules for expense allowances (outside the scope of this paper). 
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realised capital gains from those disposals only after deducting the related CGT 
charge, which amount is included in the tax liability to SARS. However, where 
policyholder assets remain unrealised but have grown in market value, the gain 
remains unrealised and as such does yet not attract tax. This does not mean the 
insurer can allocate the entire gain for the benefit of policyholders without any 
regard for tax as CGT will become due on the gain but only upon the eventual 
realisation of the asset.  
 
3.1.2 Deferred tax on unrealised investments 
 
The concept of deferred tax recognises that current events have future tax 
consequences. With regards to the above scenario of investment assets, unrealised 
capital growth of an asset stands to be taxed upon the future disposal of that asset. It 
is therefore appropriate to reserve for this future CGT liability. 39  The amount 
available for allocation to policyholders should be reduced by the unrealised CGT 
which the return would attract in case of its disposal. Practically this is done by 
recognising the existence of a deferred tax liability in addition to the policyholder 
liability, and allocating assets for the purpose of meeting this future liability. The 
insurer accordingly holds sufficient policyholder assets not only to service future 
policyholder claims, but also to meet the deferred CGT liability. 
 
3.1.3 CGT reserve 
 
It is interesting to consider the assets held in relation to the deferred CGT liability 
(the ‘CGT reserve’). These assets continue to produce investment returns and these 
returns continue to be available for the benefit of policyholders. The deferral of CGT 
until time of disposal facilitates the opportunity for greater investment returns. This 
is the essence of the tax benefit inherent in the construct of the CGT regime.  
 
Consider as an example a person purchasing shares in Company X for R100. At the 
end of the tax year the value of the shares is R150. The unrealised gain on the 
investment is R50 which includes a CGT reserve of R5 (assuming an effective CGT 
 
39
 F Kruger (FIA) (personal communications held on 17 January 2013). 
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rate of 10 per cent). If the CGT had to be paid at the end of the tax year the taxpayer 
would have had to sell some shares to free up cash. This would mean a reduced 
capital base (fewer shares) and accordingly a smaller entitlement to any future 
dividends and capital growth from the investment.  
 
ASSET BUILD UP LIABILITY PRODUCE 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An illustration of the build-up of the policyholder asset base, reserving for CGT in addition 
to the policyholder liability, and the continued fruits of the CGT reserve 
 
3.2 Understanding the mark-to-market proposal 
 
3.2.1 The intended purpose 
 
National Treasury, in advocating the annual mark-to-market proposal, commented: 
 
This annual taxation would be consistent with the approach 
already taken by long-term insurers, most or all of whom are annually 
setting aside capital gains tax potentially payable in respect of 
policyholder assets. This amount should accordingly be paid over on an 
annual basis as capital gains tax is effectively being withheld by the 
long-term insurer in its role as trustee. A mark-to-market approach 
would also be consistent with the growing trend to shift towards 
applying a mark-to-market system for treating financial products for 
financial reporting purposes.40 
 
The above paragraph reflects the view of National Treasury in respect of the 
collection of CGT on policyholder investment returns (also referred to as 
 
40
 National Treasury op cit (n24) 4. 
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policyholder ‘savings’) from the insurer under the trustee principle. There does 
however appear to be an oversight in that there is no distinction between two very 
different components of the CGT reserve. The annual ‘setting aside [of] capital gains 
tax potentially payable’ refers to the insurer’s process of reserving for future CGT as 
mentioned in the previous section. This does however not equate to an amount which 
is ‘effectively being withheld’ as is suggested in the above comment. The following 
sections aim to clearly draw the distinction between the ‘setting aside’ of CGT and 
the ‘effective withholding’ thereof. 
 
3.2.2 ‘Annually setting aside’ 
 
There is no significant difference between an insurer setting aside assets in respect of 
deferred CGT, and any other taxpayer in the same position. For the life company this 
means that the assets so set aside will not flow to policyholders in the form of future 
benefit payments, but is designated for potential future tax payments. Any other 
taxpayer investing on their own behalf will be in the same position. Take a company 
that owns an investment asset which grows in value. There is always a portion of the 
unrealised capital growth which will not be for its own benefit but will translate into 
a future tax charge following the disposal of the asset. The company will thus never 
be entitled to the full gain on the investment.41 However, at current, the capital gain 
remains unrealised and as such the taxpayer is entitled to the returns produced by the 
entire capital base, including those from the portion of assets designated for a 
potential future tax payment. 
 
3.2.3 ‘Effectively being withheld’ 
 
It is important to understand what is meant by ‘effectively withheld’. National 
Treasury cites this as the reason why unrealised gains should be taxed on an annual 
basis.  
 
41
 Accounting practice (IAS 12.20) in fact requires the recognition of a deferred tax liability on 
 balance sheet to reduce the net asset value by the future tax component. The effect of this is that a 
 company would recognise only the after-tax gain on the investment as a profit even though the tax
 liability has not yet been triggered. International Accounting Standards Board International 
 Financial Reporting Standards, 2011. 
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The withholding of taxes from policyholders can best be illustrated by considering 
the example of a linked-investment policy.42 The policyholder contributes a lump 
sum with the policy benefit being linked to the market value of Share A. The insurer 
purchases Share A in the market. The value of share A gradually increases over the 
policy term, producing an unrealised gain. On an ongoing basis the insurer provides 
for deferred CGT by notionally ‘setting aside’ a portion of the shareholding for this 
future tax payment. However, the amount is not ‘effectively withheld’ seeing as the 
policyholder remains entitled to investment returns on the entire shareholding. When 
the policy matures the insurer pays out the policyholder benefit equal to the market 
value of the shareholding less the amount which was continuously ‘set aside’ for 
CGT. The policyholder no longer has any entitlement to the return on those assets 
‘set aside’. This is the point at which CGT is ‘effectively withheld’.  
 
This concept relies on the basis that there is a link between the policyholder owning 
a policy and the insurer owning assets in support of the potential policy pay-out.  
National Treasury refers to this link using the term ‘notional policyholder 
ownership’. 43  Although the legal arrangement is such that the insurer has legal 
ownership of policyholder assets, it is ultimately the policyholder who is entitled to 
the fruits associated with ownership of those assets. (The trustee principle again 
comes through strongly). The idea of notional ownership by a policyholder means 
that events at the policyholder level are important when determining tax 
consequences of policyholder assets. Upon a policy pay-out the policyholder realises 
the financial benefits intrinsic in the assets notionally owned via the policy. The 
policyholder effectively disinvests from the policy assets – the notional ownership is 
interrupted. This notional disposal is in sync with the ‘effective withholding’ of CGT 
by the insurer. 
 
It has already been demonstrated that although there is a continuous reserving for 
deferred CGT, this does not reduce the capital base from which policyholder returns 
are produced. Even though some assets have been ‘set aside’ for future tax payments 
they continue to produce investment returns for policyholders. Accordingly this 
 
42
 Under a linked investment policy the value of the policy is derived from the value of the 
 underlying assets. The investment mimics a direct investment in the underlying assets. 
43
 National Treasury op cit (n11) 61. 
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capital cannot be regarded as having been ‘effectively withheld’ without there being 
an interruption of notional ownership. 
 
As mentioned Chapter II, there is often a timing lag between the withholding of CGT 
from policyholders and the payment thereof to SARS. This happens where an 
unrealised gain on an asset has been allocated against a policy liability, a portion of 
the asset has been ‘set aside’ for meeting the related deferred CGT liability, that 
policy has subsequently been settled44 but the asset remains unrealised. In such a 
case notional ownership of that asset by the policyholder has been interrupted and 
the related CGT is considered to have been ‘effectively withheld’ from the 
policyholder, yet the CGT reserve remains unrealised (ie the CGT is not paid to 
SARS).  
 
The CGT reserve can accordingly be split into two separate components, one relating 
to existing policy liabilities (‘in-force policies’) and the other relating to settled 
policy liabilities. Only the second category is representative of CGT which has been 
‘effectively withheld’ from policyholders. 
 
 
 LIABILITY: IN RELATION TO: PRODUCE: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Building onto Figure 1, an illustration of the two components of the CGT reserve and how 
this results in producing excess returns. 
 
 
44
 The term ‘settled’ refers to the extinguishing of a policy liability and will be used throughout this 
 paper. Various occurrences can result in ‘settlement’, for example a claim / benefit payment, 
 policy maturity, lapse, or cancellation. 
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3.2.4 An unusual benefit – ‘excess returns’ 
 
The CGT reserve having been ‘effectively withheld’ continues to produce 
investment returns. Seeing as it relates to settled policy liabilities, these are ‘excess 
returns’ over and above the returns from the asset base notionally owned by 
policyholders. 
 
Consider as an example an asset portfolio comprising of a single investment 
property. As the property grows in value, this unrealised gain is allocated against the 
various policies which are notionally invested in the property. A portion of the asset 
growth is also ‘set aside’ in respect of deferred CGT. When a single policy matures 
the insurer does not dispose of the entire property but instead funds the claim from 
working capital. The asset portion held in relation to the deferred CGT on the 
unrealised gain allocated to that particular policy thus remains on hand. The property 
continues to produce the same returns as previously, but there is now one less policy 
sharing in the total return. This clearly presents a benefit which would not otherwise 
have been available had the notional CGT charge actually been paid over to SARS.  
 
There are two potential beneficiaries of these excess returns, namely the remaining 
policyholders and the insurer itself. 45 One possibility is that the insurer prices the 
excess returns into the policyholder liabilities, thereby effectively passing on the 
benefit to policyholders. Where excess returns are not included in the policyholder 
liabilities, policyholder assets have grown by more than the related policyholder 
liabilities. Under the theory of the four funds approach, the excess returns will be 
transferred out of the policyholder asset base and added to the insurer’s asset base. 
This transfer of assets will be taxed as income in the hands of the insurer.46  
 
The fairness in the excess returns will be addressed in the next chapter as part of the 
evaluation of the mark-to-market proposal. 
  
 
45
 F Kruger (FIA) (personal communications held on 17January 2013). 
46
 In terms of s29A(7) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. This ‘transfer’ is outside the scope of 
 this dissertation. 
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Chapter IV – Evaluation of the mark-to-market proposal 
 
To recap, the intended purpose of the proposed mark-to-market taxation of long-term 
insurers is the collection of capital gains tax which have been ‘effectively withheld’ 
from policyholders. The basis for this motion is the notional ownership of the 
policyholder assets by the policyholders themselves. Accordingly events at the 
policyholder level should reflect in the actual tax transactions. Where a notional 
ownership is interrupted, this is equivalent to a notional disposal of assets and should 
accordingly be deemed to give rise to CGT. Further support for the proposal is the 
emergence of an unusual benefit in the form of excess returns. 
 
The mark-to-market proposal will now be evaluated against its intended purpose. 
The first step will be a look at the financial impact of the application of the mark-to-
market rules to the insurance environment. 
 
4.1 Financial impact of the application of the drafted mark-to-market rules to the 
insurance environment 
 
In addition to the once-off deemed disposal of policyholder assets on 29 February 
2012, the original draft s29B – as published on 5 July 2012 –47 provided for a further 
deemed disposal of policyholder assets on the last day of each year of assessment of 
an insurer. The amount for which the assets are deemed to be disposed and 
reacquired depends on which one of three categories the asset falls into (debt, 
derivative or other) but effectively comes to fair value or market value, hence ‘mark-
to-market’ taxation. Twenty-five per cent of the total gain or loss is included in each 
of the current and following three years of assessment. The purpose of spreading the 
tax liability was to smooth the impact of potentially volatile market conditions.48 
 
The following simplified example is based on actual market conditions over the past 
ten years and illustrates the financial impact of mark-to-market taxation in its 
proposed form.  
 
47
 Section 70(1) of the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2012. 
48
 National Treasury ‘Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill’ 
 (2012) 66. 
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Example: 
 
On 1 January 2003 an insurer receives R1 billion lump sum premiums from 
policyholders. This is invested into a portfolio of assets which exactly tracks the JSE 
All Share index.49 In accordance with its investment mandate the insurer annually 
disposes of 20 per cent of all policyholder assets and acquires replacement assets of 
equal value (therefore a ‘churn rate’ of 20 per cent per year). For sake of simplicity, 
(i) the effective CGT rate is assumed to be 10 per cent over the entire period of time, 
(ii) there are no premiums or claims cash flows during the period, (iii), there is no 
other income (eg interest, dividends), and (iv) no regard is given to the effect of the 
once-off deemed disposal event which occurred on 29 February 2012.  
 
Results: 
 
The following table compares certain aspects after ten years, as at 31 December 
2012, under the current law versus under the mark-to-market proposal, including (i) 
value of policyholder assets, (ii) investment return over the period, (iii) value of the 
CGT reserve, and (iv) amount of tax collected by SARS:50 
 
 
 
 
49
 JSE All Share index market data obtained from I-Net Bridge. 
50
 Calculations are included in Appendix A to this paper. 
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Over the ten year period the value of policyholder assets is reduced by R298 million 
(7.2 per cent) under mark-to-market taxation. Almost two-thirds51 of this is a result 
of accelerated tax payments to SARS (R193 million) while the remaining third is a 
consequential loss of investment returns (R105 million).  
 
It is quite evident that mark-to-market does succeed in collecting taxes on unrealised 
gains much quicker than before. This is achieved by more regular tax extractions 
from the policyholder asset base. This does however come at a price – the savings on 
the original capital contribution of R1 billion was eroded by R105 million, or 10.5 
per cent, over the ten year period. Mark-to-market taxation reduced the annualised 
investment return on policyholder assets from 15.4 per cent52 to 15.1 per cent.53  
 
4.2  Misdirected mechanism 
 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that National Treasury’s motivation for 
mark-to-market taxation failed to recognise and distinguish between two different 
components of the CGT reserve. To further illustrate this, National Treasury stated 
that: 
[I]nsurers subtract notional tax from the gain or loss [on] 
policyholder investments on a continual basis. This notional subtraction 
means that each policyholder is indirectly taxed on each policyholder’s 
allocable growth... Insurers set aside these notional taxes for future 
payment to SARS via deferred tax reserves.54 
 
As stated previously, the ‘setting aside’ of assets for future CGT payments merely 
earmarks those assets for another purpose. It is not a deduction of those assets from a 
policyholder’s notional ownership, nor a removal of a policyholder’s right to returns 
from those assets. As a result of not drawing this distinction the mark-to-market 
proposal inappropriately targets the collection of CGT on all unrealised capital gains 
on policyholder assets, not just the portion of CGT ‘effectively withheld’.  
 
In the above example, an additional R193 million worth of tax was collected by 
SARS. While a portion of this amount may rightfully be regarded as ‘effectively 
 
51
 R 193 million / R 298 million = 65%. 
52
 [ 1 + (3 187 / 1 000) ] ^ (1/10) - 1 = 15.4%. 
53
 [ 1 + (3 082 / 1 000) ] ^ (1/10) - 1 = 15.1%. 
54
 National Treasury op cit (n48) 63. 
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withheld’ from settled policies, there may also be a portion relating to CGT on 
unrealised capital gains attributed to in force policies.  
 
The recovery of CGT on unrealised capital gains attributed to in force policies 
effectively strips much of the tax deferral benefit afforded by the CGT regime. The 
mark-to-market proposal potentially results in an even quicker collection of CGT 
than the intended purpose aims for. Unrealised gains are being taxed regardless of 
events at the policyholder level. 
 
It is apparent that in an effort to recover CGT ‘effectively withheld’ from 
policyholders but not paid to SARS, mark-to-market taxation goes to the extreme 
and recovers CGT on all unrealised policyholder gains. The continuous taxation of 
unrealised capital gains attributed to in force policies raises a justifiable concern as 
to the erosive impact on policyholder savings. In my opinion the intended purpose 
which the mark-to-market proposal seeks lies somewhere between current practice 
and mark-to-market taxation. 
 
4.3  The relevance of mark-to-market taxation to pure risk business 
 
In Chapter III it was determined that the ‘effective withholding’ of CGT, which 
underpins the intended purpose of mark-to-market taxation, is based on the notional 
ownership of policyholder assets by policyholders. National Treasury used the 
analogy to effectively illustrate the impact of the increased CGT rates on insurers. 55 
It also assisted greatly in explaining the ‘effective withholding’ concept in Chapter 
III. Whether notional ownership is a feature of all insurance business requires further 
investigation. 
 
Over the years the four funds approach has been subjected to numerous critical 
evaluations by field experts. More recently some authors56 have proposed that long-
term insurance business ought to be split into a risk and an investment component 
and that these should be taxed separately and potentially under different principles. 
 
55
 Refer Chapter II. 
56
 Clover op cit (n12) 40; Donaldson op cit (n9) 86. 
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The lack of segregation of risk and investment business was raised as a problematic 
area even at the time of implementation of the four funds approach.57  
 
‘Pure risk’ business has been described to entail ‘the pooling of risks where there is a 
zero sum game for the group as a whole, after allowing for expenses, profit for the 
underwriter and interim reserving for fluctuations’.58 Theoretically, where the insurer 
accurately prices risk products, over time total premiums will exceed total claims 
only by the insurer’s profit and expenses. Accordingly normal income tax principles 
can be applied in taxing premiums as gross income, allowing for the deduction of 
claims and expenses, and adjusting for actuarial reserving.59 Taxing premiums less 
claims and expenses effectively taxes only the underwriting profits built into the 
product premiums. Actuarial reserving serves to effectively defer premiums in order 
to match its timing with that of claims.60 
 
When considering the differences in the nature of risk and investment business, there 
is a key distinction when it comes to the concept of notional ownership. While 
investment policyholders can be regarded as the notional owners of the related 
policyholder assets, this is not the case for policyholders under risk policies. 
 
Accounting practice, which gives effect to the substance of arrangements over the 
legal form 61  thereof, distinguishes between insurance contracts and investment 
contracts. In terms of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 4, a 
defining feature of an insurance contract is that an insurer ‘accepts significant 
insurance risk’. Insurance risk is defined as ‘risk other than financial risk’. 62 
 
Under a pure risk policy an insurer assumes significant insurance risk in that the 
policy pay-out is dependent on an uncertain future event (the ‘insured event’). The 
insured event may be uncertain with regards to timing (eg whole of life policy) or 
 
57
 TE Hartwig ‘Taxation of life insurance’ (1994) X(I) TASSA 196 at 200-1. 
58
 Hartwig op cit (n57) 199. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Clover adequately illustrates the impact of a lack of actuarial reserving in the case of a cluster of 
 single premium whole of life policies (ie the policy pays out only upon death of the insured). The 
 insurer would show a large amount of taxable income at inception of the business, and tax losses 
 for all subsequent years. Clover op cit (n12) 3. 
61
 International Accounting Standards Board op cit (n41) Conceptual Framework. 
62
 International Accounting Standards Board op cit (n41) IFRS 4 – Definitions. 
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with regards to its actual occurrence (eg income protection policy). The happening of 
the insured event is effectively outside of the control of both the policyholder and the 
insurer. This is important because this means that a policyholder’s entitlement to any 
benefit from a pure risk policy is contingent on the insured event. As a policyholder 
only has a conditional right to benefit payments out of the policyholder asset base, it 
cannot be said that there is a notional ownership of those assets. There is no such 
link between the ownership of assets and the policy benefits payable to enable the 
inference of notional ownership. The substance of risk business therefore is in line 
with the legal form thereof, in that the insurer really is the beneficial owner of the 
policyholder assets. Conceptually there is no notional ownership by policyholders of 
the assets held in relation to the insurer’s risk liability. 
 
Further support for the lack of notional ownership in the policyholder under a pure 
risk policy is that the investment returns produced by assets held in relation to risk 
business cannot be designated for any particular policyholder. Again, this is because 
policy pay-outs are conditional on an insured event. Rather, these investment returns 
add to the capital base available to fund future claims of the policyholder group as a 
whole. As part of premium pricing, the insurer takes into account an expectation of 
investment returns on policyholder assets and this expected return reduces the 
premiums charged to policyholders.63 
 
The trustee principle is thus irrelevant. In substance the insurer is the owner of an 
asset base which is managed to support the contractual obligations under risk 
policies. Donaldson, in researching the revamped New Zealand model for taxation of 
long-term insurance, notes that the trustee principle has indeed been removed from 
the taxation of risk business.64 Under the New Zealand approach ‘the risk portion of 
premiums, investment income, claims, expenses and policyholder reserves are 
taxable / deductible in the ... [shareholder fund]’.65 
 
 
63
 F Kruger (FIA) (personal communications held on 17January 2013). 
64
 Donaldson op cit (n9) 77-8. 
65
 Donaldson op cit (n9) 77-8. 
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It is interesting to note that South African short-term insurance is taxed in line with 
these principles.66 Apart from contract terms, there is very little difference in the 
business model of short- and long-term pure risk products. This further strengthens 
the case for a removal of long-term risk business from the trustee principle. 
 
In my opinion risk business should be removed from the scope of mark-to-market 
taxation for the following reasons: 
 
 There is no concept of notional ownership of the policyholder assets as a 
policyholder under a risk policy has only a conditional right to benefit payments 
in respect of which the insurer holds assets. 
 
 The lack of notional ownership in policyholders means that the concept of 
‘effectively withheld’ does not feature in risk business. 
 
 It is the insurer’s actions in managing the assets which should trigger tax, not 
those of policyholders.  
 
 No portion of the deferred CGT benefit can be applied to any individual in 
particular. Assets are held to meet the expected policyholder liabilities of the 
group of policyholders, therefore the group benefits as a whole. 
 
 Mark-to-market taxation of risk products will deteriorate the savings potential of 
the related asset base and will ultimately result in higher premiums for 
policyholders. 
 
4.4  Consideration of the mark-to-market proposal on investment business 
 
The trustee principle has been found to be relevant in its application to investment 
business. It successfully taxes policyholder savings on an accrual basis in the hands 
of the insurer. The concept of notional ownership fittingly applies to investment 
business as a policyholder has a vested right to benefit payments in respect of which 
 
66
 Donaldson op cit (n9) 33. 
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the insurer holds assets. Accordingly there is a link between the policyholder’s rights 
under the policy and the ownership of policyholder assets. 
 
As discussed in Chapter III, under the four funds approach there is a potential 
unusual benefit in the form of excess returns arising on that part of the CGT reserve 
which has been ‘effectively withheld’ from policyholders. Following a policy pay-
out, there is no longer a notional ownership by any policyholder to the assets ‘set 
aside’ in respect of CGT attributed to that policy. Yet those assets continue to 
produce investment returns. These can either be absorbed by the insurer or applied 
for the benefit of the policyholders. 
 
SARS made the following comment as part of its response to written representations 
on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2005: 
 
The long run policy goal is to create more neutrality in the tax 
treatment on the returns of capital invested by individuals. Clearly, 
from a tax policy perspective one would like to strive for equity and 
neutrality in order to create an environment conducive to retirement 
savings with the maximum utilization of competitive market forces that 
tend to reduce transaction costs in the long-term savings market, with 
commensurate higher investment returns for individual policyholders.67 
 
Neutrality in the taxation of different types of investments has always been a crucial 
factor on which the four funds model is based. Next to the trustee principle, this was 
another one of the key principles in the original design of the four funds model. It is 
not only tax neutrality between different investment vehicles which should endure 
under the four funds model, but also competitive neutrality between the insurance 
industry and other financial industries.68 
 
Clearly, where excess returns accrue to the insurer this would be considered an 
undue benefit seeing as the insurer is merely a trustee and should not have 
entitlement to investment returns on capital held for the benefit of policyholders. The 
 
67
 Clover op cit (n12) 29. 
68
 Hartwig op cit (n57) 199-203. 
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situation where policyholders receive excess returns also constitutes an undue benefit 
which is not available to other forms of investment.  
 
The mark-to-market proposal would therefore appropriately remove either of these 
undue benefits. Mark-to-market does however come with significant concerns over 
its potential side-effects on the erosion of policyholder savings. 
 
It would therefore be appropriate to compare the overall CGT rules applicable to a 
long-term investment policy against an alternative investment opportunity. In the 
next chapter a comparison to the taxation of CISs is performed to identify whether 
there is neutrality between the taxation of these investments. 
 
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Chapter V – Comparison of the CGT rules applicable to an investment policy in 
the IPF versus an investment in a portfolio of a collective investment scheme in 
securities 
 
The main issue with the annual mark-to-market taxation of policyholder capital gains 
lies in the potentially erosive impact on policyholder savings. This affects the 
competitiveness of investment product offerings by long-term insurers. It was also 
highlighted that there is potentially an undue benefit afforded to investment policies 
when compared to alternative savings media, in the form of excess returns. 
 
This chapter will compare the CGT rules applicable to an individual investment 
policy against those applicable to an investment by an individual in portfolio of a 
collective investment scheme in securities (‘CIS’). This is believed to be an 
appropriate comparison as both an investment policy and a CIS rely on the trustee 
principle. A CIS holds and administers a portfolio of assets on behalf of investors. 
The total asset portfolio is notionally subdivided into a number of units of equal 
value. An investor in a CIS owns a participatory interest in the portfolio which is 
represented by a number of units out of the total pool of units, and is accordingly 
referred to as a ‘unit holder’. While the legal ownership of the assets remains with 
the CIS, the notional ownership thereof by the investors is given effect by way of 
this unitisation. Similar to an investment policy, a CIS offers investors the 
opportunity to invest even small amounts into diversified asset portfolios.69 
 
The taxation of a CIS is akin to that of a trust. On the condition that any income 
which accrues to a CIS is distributed to its unit holders within 12 months of receipt, 
the income is deemed to accrue directly to the unit holder on the date of distribution. 
Income which is not distributed within the said 12 month period is taxed in the hands 
of the CIS at the 40 per cent70 tax rate applicable to trusts.71 
 
A capital gain or loss is determined in the hands of a unit holder in respect of the 
participatory interest held upon the disposal of that participatory interest. The capital 
 
69
 M Botha et al. The South African Financial Planning Handbook (2008) 529. 
70
 Paragraph 3 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No 22 of 2012. 
71
 Section 25BA of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.  
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gain or loss is calculated with reference to the proceeds from the disposal and base 
cost of that participatory interest.72 A disposal of portfolio assets by the CIS itself is 
not an event which triggers CGT.73 
 
This presents the first and foremost difference in the taxation of an investment policy 
versus a CIS – timing. In terms of the four funds approach policyholder capital gains 
are taxed under the realisation rules of the Eighth Schedule with CGT triggered by a 
disposal of portfolio assets. The taxation of capital gains in a CIS is disconnected 
from the disposal of portfolio assets. Instead it is taxed in the hands of the unit 
holders when the benefits from the investment (ie capital and returns) are paid to the 
unit holder. The notional units in the CIS effectively represent the investment asset 
and a disposal thereof equates to a disposal of the underlying assets. This is a special 
concession which affords investors the benefit of enjoying capital growth in a 
managed portfolio, with tax only charged at the time of disinvestment. On the 
contrary policyholders suffer periodic bites out of their capital base as a result of 
actual asset disposals in the normal course of the asset management activities of the 
insurer. 
 
The same principle does not apply to non-capital investment returns from a CIS (eg 
interest, dividends) as these are taxed on an accrual basis in accordance with 
standard income tax laws. This is consistent with the treatment of investment 
policies. The main difference here is that an insurer pays over the tax on behalf of 
the policyholders who receive after-tax benefits, while unit holders are liable for 
their own tax affairs as part of their personal income tax returns.  
 
This does however give rise to another significant difference in the taxation of a 
policy versus a CIS – the tax rate. The IPF is taxed at a flat rate of 30 per cent.74 
Policies are thus taxed at an effective CGT rate of 10 per cent. Unit holders in a CIS 
are taxed at their individual marginal tax rates. The marginal CGT rates currently 
range from 6 per cent75 to 13.3 per cent.76 This rate differential presents apparent 
 
72
 Paragraphs 61(1) & 61(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
73
 Paragraph 61(3) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
74
 Refer Chapter I – 1.2 ‘Overview of the four funds approach’. 
75
 Minimum marginal rate of 18% x CGT inclusion rate of 33.3%. 
76
 Maximum marginal rate of 40% x CGT inclusion rate of 33.3%. 
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advantages to high income earners, offering investment opportunities at beneficial 
tax rates. The income group that stands to benefit earns taxable income over R793 
000 per annum.77 Individuals earning less than this effectively pay more taxes on 
investment income in a long-term policy than they would in a CIS. 
 
A further consequence of the insurer as proxy is that the annual CGT exclusion 
amounts available to individuals (currently R30 000 or R300 000 in the event of 
death)78 are not utilised in determining the CGT liability on policyholder savings.79 
 
From the above analysis the following is evident: 
 
 The four funds approach charges CGT on a continual basis based on asset 
disposals within the asset portfolio. Although the full amount of tax is only 
withheld from policy benefits at maturity, some of the CGT would already have 
been stripped from the asset portfolio and paid over to SARS. An investor in a 
CIS pays CGT only on disinvestment. 
 
 The CGT rate applicable to individual investment policy savings is 10 per cent. 
The CGT rate applicable to CIS savings ranges between 6 to 13.3 per cent. The 
taxation of an investment policy therefore prejudices against low income earners 
and benefits high income earners. 
 
 The annual CGT exclusions can be utilised against capital gains arising in a CIS 
but not against those from an investment policy. 
 
Under current laws, there is already unfavourable taxation of investment policies 
when compared to CISs. While the issue of the average tax rate can be either 
beneficial or detrimental, it is important to recognise that for the vast majority of 
South African taxpayers CGT in a life policy is more expensive than in a CIS.80 This 
 
77
 Using the tax tables and primary rebate, the tax chargeable on taxable income of R793 000 of an 
 individual under 65 years of age is R237 900. R237 900 / R793 000 = 30%. 
78
 Paragraph 5 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
79
 Similarly, the interest exemptions of s 10(1)(i) are not utilised. 
80
 According to the most recent 2012 Tax Statistics published by SARS, only 2.6% of individual 
 taxpayers earn taxable income over R 750 000. This accounts for only 18.8% of taxable income. 
 (SARS, 2012:A2.1.1). 
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issue is not limited to CGT and is relevant to all taxable investment income in the 
policyholder fund. 
 
While the existence of a potential undue benefit to investment policies has been 
recognised, this should not be addressed in isolation without any regard of the other 
inconsistencies which have been pointed out.   
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Chapter VI – Summary of findings & proposals 
 
6.1  Summary of findings from the evaluation of the mark-to-market proposal 
 
As a first step in evaluating the mark-to-market proposal, the intended purpose of the 
proposal had to be understood. The intended purpose was interpreted to be the 
collection of CGT which has been ‘effectively withheld’ from policyholders by 
insurers. For CGT to be considered ‘effectively withheld’ there has to be an 
interruption of policyholder notional ownership. 
 
It was established that the proposal does succeed in the earlier collection of CGT 
which has been ‘effectively withheld’ from policyholders. However, the basis argued 
in favour of mark-to-market taxation was misdirected at the entire CGT reserve 
instead of only the portion thereof relating to settled policies. Consequently, it is not 
only ‘effectively withheld’ CGT which is collected, but CGT on the entire unrealised 
gain from policyholder assets. This raised concern over the potentially erosive side-
effect on policyholder savings potential. 
 
I am in strong agreement with the intended purpose of the mark-to-market proposal. 
I would however like to qualify the motivation for the proposal by doing away with 
any regard for the ‘setting aside’ of assets for CGT reserving. My interpretation of 
the intended purpose of the mark-to-market proposal reads: 
 
Where there is a valid notional ownership of policyholder 
assets by policyholders, the settlement of a policy liability 
gives rise to the effective withholding of any allocable CGT. 
Such CGT should be paid over to SARS without any deferral 
to subsequent tax years. 
 
This is effectively the alignment of the CGT trigger with notional disinvestments by 
policyholders. 
 
An argument was put forward to exclude pure risk business from any mark-to-
market considerations. This is based on a lack of notional ownership in the 
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policyholders and accordingly CGT on the related asset base cannot be considered to 
be ‘effectively withheld’ when policy liabilities are settled. The substance of a risk 
contract is such that the insurer really is the beneficial owner of policyholder assets 
and as such it is disposals at the insurer level which should trigger tax, not events at 
the policyholder level. Should mark-to-market taxation be applied to risk business, 
any foregone investment returns will have to be recouped by way of increased policy 
premiums (ie more expensive risk products). 
 
A much stronger argument exists for a change to the taxation of investment business. 
There is good reason to align the timing of the taxation of capital gains with policy 
benefit payments. However, mark-to-market taxation does not achieve this without 
creating a serious concern over potentially adverse consequences to policyholder 
savings. This is especially important in the light of the existing differences in tax 
treatment of investment policies compared to similar investment alternatives.  
 
6.2  Proposals 
 
General  
 
It is proposed that before any attempt is made to recover CGT ‘effectively withheld’ 
from policyholders, the taxation of risk and investment business be segregated and 
each component taxed independently. 
 
For risk business, it is proposed that the current realisation basis of CGT be 
maintained as it resembles more closely the substance of the transactions than any 
alignment with policyholder events would. The indefinite deferral of CGT on 
investment growth is part of the nature of the structure and there are no benefits to 
any individuals in particular. The gains serve the policyholder fund as a whole and 
where there is no realisation event there is no reason for tax. 
 
It is further recommended that the concern over the insurer receiving a potential 
undue benefit by not passing back excess returns to policyholders be addressed by 
the Financial Services Board’s ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ initiative. This may 
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include transparency reporting, for example annually comparing an insurer’s 
recovery of taxes from policyholders versus the payment of taxes to SARS. 
 
The taxation of investment business should be revisited as a whole. This does not 
imply a complete overhaul of the trustee principle, but a refinement thereof with 
specific focus on all identified weaknesses (not only those raised in this research 
dissertation). The intended purpose of the mark-to-market proposal should feature as 
only one of a number of items to be addressed. At the very least, if a move to a tax 
basis aligned with notional disinvestments is considered (similar to that of a CIS), 
the current realisation basis of CGT on asset disposals should be brought into 
question at the same time. 
 
Separation of linked investment business 
 
One of the most recent recommendations for improvement of the four funds 
approach was to not only separate the taxation of risk and investment business, but in 
addition to separate linked investment products from other investment products.81 In 
addition to the four tax funds, linked investment products can then be treated for tax 
purposes in an entirely separate tax fund. The basis for this is that linked investment 
products function in a similar way to CISs. The link between the policyholder’s 
financial rights under the linked investment policy and the assets held by the insurer 
in respect of the policy is so direct that the insurer can easily attribute investment 
returns to specific policyholders. This direct allocation of investment returns enables 
the taxation of those savings in a way similar to that of CISs. For one, savings can 
potentially be taxed at the tax rates of the underlying policyholders. In addition, CGT 
can be charged on policyholder disinvestments and the realisation basis can thus be 
eradicated.82 
 
This dissertation strongly supports the theory behind this proposal. It maintains the 
trustee principle and gives effect to notional ownership by aligning the trigger of 
CGT with policy benefit payments. However, this deals only with linked investment 
policies.  
 
81
 Donaldson op cit (n9) 80-1. 
82
 Donaldson op cit (n9) 83. 
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Alternative proposal to mark-to-market in respect of non-linked investment business 
 
It is a difficult task to align CGT with notional policyholder disinvestments for non-
linked investments. This is because of practical difficulties in the allocation of 
investment income to specific policyholders.83 
 
If a single pool of assets were managed for a single group of policyholders, all 
policyholders would share the different components of the investment income 
produced by those assets (eg interest, dividends, capital gains) proportionally. It 
follows that any benefit payments, being analogous to notional policyholder 
disinvestments, could be viewed as a deemed disposal of a proportionate share of the 
pool of assets. For example, where there is a pool of assets of R100, and during a 
year R30 is paid out to policyholders, the insurer may be deemed to have realised 
30% of the asset base and be taxed on 30% of the existing unrealised gains. This 
deemed realised gain should be reduced by any actual realised gains arising from 
asset disposals. Alternatively, the realisation basis of CGT could be withdrawn 
completely. 
 
What this alternative proposal would achieve is an alignment of the trigger for CGT 
with the notional disinvestment by policyholders. Importantly, CGT will be triggered 
regardless of whether the insurer funds benefit payments from working capital or by 
actually realising policyholder assets. This addresses the root cause of the timing lag 
between CGT being ‘effectively withheld’ from policyholders and the payment 
thereof to SARS. It does however rely heavily on the assumption that all 
policyholders share proportionally in the entire policyholder asset base.  
 
The problem with this assumption can best be illustrated by considering an extreme 
example. A large block of risk averse investment policies matures in a single year, 
with no other maturities. The insurer invested the policyholder premiums in 
corporate bonds and timed the maturity of these bonds with the maturity of the 
policies. The benefit payments are accordingly funded out of the proceeds from 
disinvestment of the bonds. There was no realised gain on the disposal of these 
 
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 Donaldson op cit (n9) 80. 
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bonds (because of the nature of the asset which was held to maturity). However, in 
terms of the alternative proposal a portion of any existing unrealised capital gains on 
hand is deemed to be realised. 
 
A final recommendation is therefore to further explore the feasibility of this 
alternative as part of the current four funds review project. It should be tested under 
different case scenarios, in consultation with industry stakeholders, to determine the 
sensitivity on the underlying assumption. Practical and implementation issues should 
also be considered. In my opinion, this alternative fits neatly with the theory of 
notional ownership, much more so than mark-to-market taxation.  
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Conclusion 
 
Based on the research performed the mark-to-market proposal should not be 
implemented while the taxation of risk and savings business remains consolidated. In 
the event that the taxation of risk and savings business become segregated, the risk 
component should not be subjected to mark-to-market taxation as there is no basis 
for such a tax and it will ultimately increase the cost of risk products in South Africa. 
In the savings environment there is a strong argument in favour of the intended 
purpose of the proposal. However, mark-to-market taxation is not considered an 
appropriate mechanism to achieve the stated intended purpose. There is a potentially 
negative impact on policyholder savings. Instead it is proposed that CGT under the 
trustee principle be changed from a tax on asset disposals to a tax on notional 
policyholder disinvestments. This will result more closely in tax neutrality between 
investment policies and alternative forms of savings. 
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Appendix A - Financial analysis of the impact of mark-to-mark taxation on the policyholder asset base 
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